Veteran Leader with Fourteen Years of Experience Resigns, Oriental Fund and Its Dusty Past

In the mainland public fund industry, where tides rise and fall and personnel changes are frequent, it is rare to see someone hold a leadership position steadily for over ten years. However, as the era’s train moves into a new cycle, even the most enduring commitments will eventually reach their end.

On March 20th, the established public fund institution Dongfang Fund issued an important personnel change announcement, stating that Chairman Cui Wei is stepping down due to “work adjustments,” effective March 18, 2026.

Cui Wei has served as Chairman of Dongfang Fund since November 2011, leading the company for over 14 years and 4 months, leaving a deep imprint throughout the organization. But even with such influence, he is inevitably bidding farewell to the platform he helped build at age 58.

For the public fund industry, this is a noteworthy example of a new-old leadership transition. Not only because Cui Wei’s tenure of more than fourteen years is unusually long, but also because he inherited a public fund company that had just suffered severe internal power struggles and was significantly weakened, and now it seems to be facing another personnel change.

With Cui Wei’s departure, the old stories once repeatedly discussed by the media and gradually buried by time—those early personnel upheavals, the chaotic boardroom power struggles—resurface once again.

This is not only a business story about capital, power, human nature, and systems but also a classic case of how to rebuild order amid governance “hollowness.”

Career Path: From Regulatory System to Public Fund Chairman

To understand Cui Wei’s significance to Dongfang Fund, one must delve into his personal background and leadership experience. Born in November 1967, now 58 years old, this seasoned financial professional’s career is characterized by a strong background in “regulatory experience” and “management-oriented academic training.”

Cui Wei is highly educated; some say he holds a Ph.D. from the former China Renmin University Graduate School of Finance (now at the School of Finance at Tsinghua University), class of 1999, mentored by a prominent figure in the securities industry.

Prior to that, he had already made a name for himself within the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) system. He held positions such as officer in the Investigation and Statistics Department, deputy director, director, and deputy secretary-general of the General Office of the PBOC. During China’s early financial reforms—marked by both pioneering efforts and regulatory tightening—serving in core departments of the financial system undoubtedly helped him develop macro perspectives and policy sensitivity.

After years of experience at the PBOC, Cui Wei transitioned to the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), serving as deputy director and director of the Office of the CSRC. He then returned to the PBOC, gaining experience as deputy head of the Dongguan Central Sub-branch and head of the Shantou Central Sub-branch, also serving as director of the Shantou branch of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange.

Later, Cui Wei rejoined the CSRC, serving as deputy director of the Hainan Regulatory Bureau and subsequently promoted to director. During his tenure in Hainan, he focused on promoting the standardized operation of listed companies and securities and futures institutions in the region. He also served as deputy director of the CSRC Coordination Department and head of the Investor Education Office.

In November 2011, Cui Wei was unexpectedly appointed Chairman of Dongfang Fund, taking over a company that was already operating on the brink. With his “macro regulatory perspective + local operational experience + high academic literacy,” his initial task was not aggressive expansion but rather acting as a “firefighter” and “order fixer.”

Old Stories: The “Personnel Quagmire” During Startup

When Cui Wei took over Dongfang Fund, the company had been established for seven years and had gone through multiple management teams. However, many star talents had failed to elevate the company’s scale.

On the contrary, under the common scenario in China’s early public fund industry (which still persists today), conflicts among the “company shareholders—management—core investment and research talents” led to repeated personnel upheavals and shifts in positioning.

Founded in 2004 with a “golden key,” Dongfang Fund’s founding shareholders were quite diverse: Northeast Securities, as the largest shareholder (holding 46%), was the main operator, representing Shanghai State-owned assets via Shanghai Water Co., Ltd., along with two other minor shareholders each holding 18%.

For other listed company shareholders, investing in a fund company was primarily a way to secure stable cash flow; but for the dominant Northeast Securities (with its state-owned background), Dongfang Fund was a crucial part of its financial empire. Early on, signs of divergence appeared.

At inception, the team was extremely luxurious. The first general manager was Wang Guobin, a veteran from Dongfang Securities. He built a top-tier investment research team, recruiting star fund manager Feng Xiaowu from Harvest Fund, experienced fund managers Song Bingshan from Bosera and GF Fund, and core personnel from Dongfang Securities Asset Management.

In 2004, this was a lineup that dazzled the public fund industry, and many of these figures later became influential investment leaders.

However, this market-oriented team soon clashed with the large shareholders’ state-owned and brokerage-oriented mindset, leading to irreconcilable differences over control. Within half a year, Wang Guobin resigned in regret, Chen Guangming returned to Dongfang Securities Asset Management, and Feng Xiaowu also quietly left.

The luxurious team disintegrated rapidly, replaced by management from the major shareholder system. With backgrounds from China Construction Bank and Northeast Securities, Cheng Hong served as acting general manager, with the remaining senior fund managers shouldering the investment responsibilities. The “personnel quagmire” in the startup phase caused Dongfang Fund to miss its best initial positioning.

Old Stories: Rising Star Fund Managers and Governance Challenges

After Song Bingshan moved to Changsheng Fund in early 2006, Dongfang Fund’s original investment research core was effectively vacant. At this point, an unknown young talent was pushed to the forefront—Fu Yong.

Fu Yong had early experience in investment banking and auditing at Hualong Securities and Northeast Securities. When he joined Dongfang Fund’s preparatory team in 2002, he was responsible for strategic planning but lacked long-term public market investment experience. In 2005, he became an assistant fund manager for “Dongfang Dragon,” and by the end of that year, he was promoted to fund manager.

This semi-unknown figure, Fu Yong, launched a brief but brilliant “Fu Yong era” at Dongfang Fund. During 2006–2007, amid a booming A-share market and the benefits of the share reform, Fu Yong’s keen market sense led him to heavily invest in “S-shares” (stocks not yet reformed under the share reform).

Reports from that period show Fu Yong identified the investment opportunity in share reform, thoroughly researched over 1,000 un-reformed companies, and aggressively built positions in S-shares like S-Shanghai Petrochemical, S-Haoyao, and S-Shenzhen Baoan A, executing a high-conviction, high-positions strategy.

This approach was highly successful. In 2006, Dongfang Selected’s net value grew by 104%, outperforming benchmarks significantly, with five dividend distributions setting records. In 2007, the fund’s net value surged by 168.81%, ranking among the top three in its category. Fu Yong was hailed as a “rising star fund manager.”

Under Fu Yong’s dazzling performance, Dongfang Selected gained market popularity. After a split in 2007, its size rapidly expanded to hundreds of billions. Internal reports and media coverage indicated that during that period, Fu Yong’s management of Dongfang Selected contributed over 90% of Dongfang Fund’s profits. He single-handedly carried the company.

However, behind Fu Yong’s “white knight” performance, Dongfang Fund, after scaling up, failed to strengthen its research team or turn market opportunities into team advantages. Instead, it continued to pursue profit and cut costs, leading to conflicts such as cross-position management and insufficient incentive mechanisms for fund managers—foreshadowing future issues.

Old Stories: The Departure of a “Star Fund Manager” and Boardroom “Internal Strife” Shocking the Industry

After 2008, as the A-share market experienced a major correction, the decline of S-shares’ dividends, Fu Yong’s performance myth could no longer be sustained. Meanwhile, internal power struggles intensified.

In early 2009, the then-CEO, unable to meet board expectations, resigned. The major shareholder, Northeast Securities, appointed a younger CEO to take over Dongfang Fund, whose assertive style quickly disrupted the fragile internal balance.

In early 2010, star fund manager Fu Yong finally resigned after persistent efforts, leaving after six years. He left behind two books: Jin Yinan’s “Suffering and Glory” and the popular workplace novel “Dulala’s Promotion,” which later became metaphors for employees’ helplessness at Dongfang Fund.

Fu Yong’s departure triggered a full-scale conflict among senior management. In early 2011, a board meeting record of Dongfang Fund was unexpectedly leaked to the media, shocking the entire public fund circle.

The record showed that the then-chairman publicly questioned the general manager at the meeting. Independent directors expressed strong dissatisfaction with management’s assertiveness and vetoed some issues. However, due to the influence of the major shareholder, discussions in the board were powerless.

The cost of this escalation was severe: collective personnel changes among directors, a sharp decline in external cooperation willingness, and increased client redemptions. Under internal and external pressures, Dongfang Fund was unable to launch new products for a long time, and business development nearly stalled.

“Firefighter” Appointed

In this chaos and stormy period, Cui Wei, with a strong regulatory background, was appointed to “rescue” Dongfang Fund, beginning his 14-year tenure as Chairman.

The latest announcement from Dongfang Fund highly praised Cui Wei’s leadership: “During Cui Wei’s tenure as Chairman, he was diligent, dedicated, and made significant contributions to the company’s strategic development, governance improvement, and stable operation, laying a solid foundation for the company’s long-term healthy development.”

This is not just polite words. For Dongfang Fund, Cui Wei’s 14 years essentially represented a process of “stopping the bleeding, healing wounds, and rebuilding growth capacity.”

Rewinding to 2011, when Cui Wei took over as Chairman, he faced not applause but a “hot potato.”

At that time, Dongfang Fund had just experienced a prolonged and intense internal power struggle. Corporate governance was in disarray, management and the board were openly at odds, and core investment talents had left. Under such internal conflict, the company’s business was severely damaged.

Data shows that at that time, Dongfang Fund’s entrusted assets under management were shrinking, falling below 10 billion RMB by the end of 2011.

Cui Wei’s arrival, with his “special” yet experienced governance background, became an opportunity for the company to “stop the bleeding and rebuild.” Through bold internal reforms, he spent considerable time and effort to clear up the company’s previous issues, setting it back on a growth track. Over 14 years, Dongfang Fund’s assets under management grew to over 120 billion RMB (source: Choice).

Many internal details remain unknown to outsiders. But what is visible is that over the past fourteen years, Dongfang Fund has gradually emerged from the shadow of the “Fu Yong incident,” ranking around 50th in the industry for public fund assets under management.

From a near-death situation with less than 10 billion RMB, to a mid-sized public fund with over 100 billion RMB, Cui Wei has indeed brought this unruly company back onto a sustainable growth path.

Where to Next: Facing a New Cycle and the Need to Break Through

The flip side of Dongfang Fund’s past fourteen years of stability is that its “steady” approach has led to a clear skew in its data.

Choice statistics show that of the current over 120 billion RMB in assets, fixed income products (bonds, money market funds, etc.) dominate, while equity and hybrid funds—reflecting core research capabilities and higher profit margins—account for less than 20%.

This “heavy fixed income, light equity” structure is partly a legacy of research talent gaps and partly reflects the risk preferences of a management team with a regulatory background.

However, in the era of vigorous equity markets and recent passive investment (ETFs), this historical development path has limited Dongfang Fund’s resource endowment, causing it to miss opportunities for another leap forward.

The once relatively stable leadership structure was suddenly interrupted in March 2026. Cui Wei, before reaching retirement age, announced his departure, with General Manager Liu Hongpeng temporarily taking over. This indicates that the next chairman (or leader) of Dongfang Fund has yet to be firmly decided.

Compared to Cui Wei, Liu Hongpeng’s background is more that of a market-grown operational manager. Early in his career, he worked at several brokerages, including serving as general manager of the Changchun branch of Xinhua Securities, and later held roles at Northeast Securities such as general manager of the Hangzhou branch, deputy general manager of the marketing management department, and general manager. He joined Dongfang Fund in May 2011, prior to Cui Wei, and has served as assistant general manager, deputy general manager, and since 2016, as general manager.

Liu Hongpeng, a long-time internal candidate who grew within the company during Cui Wei’s tenure, differs from the externally appointed “regulatory system” leader like Cui Wei and lacks his authoritative prestige. Whether he can fully take over Dongfang Fund remains to be seen.

He faces many practical challenges.

The current public fund industry is undergoing profound transformation. Policies promoting “fee reduction and profit sharing” have squeezed profit margins and increased operational thresholds for small and medium-sized firms; capital, talent, and resources are increasingly flowing toward top-tier and specialized institutions, creating pressure on smaller firms; meanwhile, the rise of ETFs and passive investing is disrupting traditional active equity strategies, and fixed income products are caught in a low-yield “involution” battle.

For Dongfang Fund, the original challenge was “whether it can survive and escape internal strife,” but now the question is “whether it can develop a new growth curve under new rules.”

Liu Hongpeng’s burden remains heavy, opportunities for growth are fleeting, and time is pressing.