French municipal election review: Far-right encroaches on the left's hold, "Macronism" near dusk

For a long time, France has been regarded as a model of centralized power since modern times in Europe. Especially thanks to Tocqueville’s horizontal comparison of “democracy in America” and “despotism in France,” this ingrained impression has taken root. But in reality, over the more than a hundred years since Tocqueville, this centralized system has undergone multiple trial-and-error adjustments, and its rigidity has been greatly eased. The most notable example is the standardization and refinement of municipal elections: the local officials closest to citizens’ daily lives, elected democratically, form a strong buffer against the state’s will.

On March 22, 2026, local time, in Paris, France, staff manage ballot boxes at a polling station. China News Service photographer Li Yang

Because of this, the municipal elections held once every six years have been endowed with unique significance: although they do not determine high-level personnel, they largely reflect trends in public opinion shifts and the rise and fall of various political forces. The 2026 municipal elections are the first practice after the electoral system reform in Paris, Lyon, and Marseille, the three major cities, and are only a year away from the 2027 presidential election, making their significance especially important.

This election was held in two rounds on March 15 and 22. After a new round of reshuffling in the local landscape, several trends can be generally observed: traditional center-right remains deeply rooted; the left has not experienced the expected decline and has largely held its ground; far-right, while not causing a tidal wave, is eating away at more and more territory; the “Republican Front” against the far right still exists but shows signs of loosening.

Most critically, in the face of the deeply rooted right, the steady left, and the encroaching far right, the centrist forces represented by Macron’s camp remain weak. Although on the surface this camp also seems to barely hold its ground and even makes some small gains, the meaning of the same political landscape in 2026 is completely different from that in 2020. It can be said that under the apparent stability, the historic opportunity for the centrists to reshape the landscape has probably been lost. Although the “Macron era” will officially end in 2027, this local election has already sounded the farewell a year in advance.

Far-right encroachment

France’s so-called “commune” actually covers a vast range—from mega-metropolises to tiny villages: Paris, with a population of up to 2 million, and Rochefourchat, with only two permanent residents, can both be individual electoral districts in municipal elections. Therefore, the political weight of different-sized communes varies greatly; the same title of “mayor” (maire) can mean a local lord or a village chief in a remote area. Out of nearly 35k communes nationwide, most are small, and those with real political significance are the more than 650 large and medium-sized communes with populations over 14k, especially the 42 major cities with populations over 100k.

According to Le Monde’s review, among these 650+ large and medium-sized communes, after this election, nearly one-third changed hands between different parties, with gains and losses on all sides, and the overall political landscape remains stable. However, the far right is a notable exception: it not only held onto the 9 communes it previously controlled but also gained 18 more, tripling the number of large and medium-sized communes under its control. Although the absolute number is not large and usually involves smaller municipalities, the momentum is still significant.

In the 2020 election, the National Rally (RN) won the city of Perpignan in southern France after two rounds, marking the party’s first time governing a large city with a population over 100k—an epoch-making milestone. Six years later, RN’s advantage in the city has become even more solid, with Mayor Louis Aliot crossing 50% in the first round and winning re-election outright.

Apart from Perpignan, RN faced bottlenecks in major cities and failed to win any new city with a population over 100k, but it secured over 3,000 mayoral and council seats out of more than 3,100 communes, a significant leap from 827 seats in 2020. It also took control of over 60 small and medium-sized communes such as Carcassonne, Orange, Menton, and Cagnes-sur-Mer. Party leader Jordan Bardella called this the party’s “biggest breakthrough in history.” Notably, Montargis, a small town near Paris with deep ties to China and once a “red base” for leftist revolutionary leaders during their studies in France, also fell into far-right hands this time, with a somewhat ironic historical twist.

Local time March 15, 2026, in Sarreguemines, Lorraine, France, municipal hall is holding local elections. Visual China

Even in cities where RN failed to take power, the party has caused mainstream traditional parties to tremble: in Toulon, a port city on the Mediterranean, RN candidate scored 42% in the first round, far ahead of the center-right candidate, but benefited from the “Republican Front”—where other candidates withdrew to consolidate votes—successfully blocking the far right and ultimately winning. In Nîmes in southern France, RN candidate led with 30.39% in the first round but was overtaken by the Communist candidate in the second round. This city, long governed by the right, almost fell into far-right hands but then swung to the radical left, creating the biggest turnaround of this municipal election.

Beyond RN, the biggest breakthrough for the far right was the victory of the “Union of the Right” (UDR), a split from the traditional center-right, in Nice, France’s fifth-largest city. Leader Éric Ciotti led with 43.43% in the first round, far ahead of the incumbent mayor Christian Estrosi of The Republicans (LR), who had been in office for 18 years. Before the second round, the left-wing candidate refused to withdraw, and LR also refused to support the defector who had previously joined the centrist camp. Ultimately, the “Republican Front” failed to form, and Ciotti took the mayoralty of Nice unopposed.

Using Nice as a typical example, it is clear that France’s traditional mainstream parties are experiencing erosion of their “big picture” against the far right. The “Republican Front” is no longer a guaranteed strategy. Besides Nice, in Reims, Draguignan, Brie-Comte-Robert, and other places, there have been cases of center-right and far-right openly colluding in the second round, and more candidates from The Republicans publicly supporting RN as individuals. Although the party has not yet crossed the red line of openly merging with RN, frequent disciplinary sanctions against members who do so indicate that the previously clear boundary between the two is gradually blurring.

Left-wing steadfastness

Within the left camp, “Unbowed France” (LFI) faces a similar extreme force dilemma: should it be regarded as “far-left” or “radical left”? The Interior Ministry and administrative courts recognize the former, while LFI strongly defends itself. The difference is that “far-left” fundamentally does not accept the republican system, so cooperation with it is tantamount to opening the gates to theft; “radical left,” on the other hand, still operates within the republican framework, leaving some room for cooperation.

For “Unbowed France,” a more unfavorable background is that, just one month before the municipal elections, a far-right youth, Quentin Deranque, was beaten to death by far-left militants, and