Original Title: Day 29: What could possibly be the U.S. options in Iran?
Original Author: John Spencer
Translated by: Peggy, BlockBeats

Editor’s Note: While external discussions continue on “whether it will evolve into ground warfare,” the logic of this conflict has already moved beyond traditional war frameworks.

This article attempts to answer not whether the U.S. will “go in,” but what means the U.S. might have to change the opponent’s behavior without occupying the capital. From missiles and naval power to energy exports, power systems, and information control to internal governance structures, the targets are shifting from singular military capabilities to the overall operational system of a nation.

In this process, the real key is no longer regime change, but rather by simultaneously suppressing both “operational capabilities” and “governance capabilities,” to force adjustments in decision-making under multiple pressures. This nonlinear, cross-dimensional pressure strategy is becoming the new logic of warfare.

It is precisely for this reason that the more noteworthy aspect of this conflict is not what has already occurred, but rather those options that have yet to be unfolded.

Below is the original text:

The U.S.-Iran war has now lasted for 29 days. Nowadays, true strategic and military analysis is increasingly difficult to distinguish from politicized views, conjectures, and narratives. Too many people habitually jump directly to the conclusion of “full ground invasion,” as if the only option for the U.S. is to seize Tehran, forcibly control nuclear facilities, crush a so-called million-man army, and then once again fall into the quagmire of decades-long state reconstruction or something akin to Maoist guerrilla warfare.

This is not analysis. This is merely a shallow judgment based on outdated or even biased models of warfare.

President Trump has stated that strikes against Iranian energy infrastructure will be paused for 10 days, and this deadline has now been extended to April 6. We are currently within this time window. But the real question is not what has already happened, but rather — what options remain.

From Military Strikes to System Paralysis

It is certain that the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and Israel will continue to carry out systematic strikes against Iran’s military system. Iran began the war with thousands of ballistic missiles, hundreds of launchers, a distributed drone network, multi-layered naval capabilities in the Persian Gulf, and a military-industrial system that is resilient and survivable. This system is being weakened, but has not been completely destroyed.

Meanwhile, Israel’s targets are not limited to military capabilities alone; more crucially, they aim to weaken the regime’s ability to maintain control after the conflict. This includes eliminating political and military leadership, striking internal stability forces like the Basij, and disrupting checkpoints, intelligence nodes, and internal security networks.

This is not just tactical action but a strategic pressure targeting both “means” and “will”: weakening both operational capabilities and governance capabilities. This is how one can force the opponent to change behavior without occupying the capital.

Any discussion must anchor around established strategic objectives. According to U.S. officials, the goals of “Operation Epic Fury” include: destroying Iran’s missile systems and production capabilities, dismantling its naval power and its ability to threaten global shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, and preventing it from obtaining nuclear weapons.

Although “regime change” has been discussed, it is not an official objective. The real goal is “behavior change.” The current regime has been offered diplomatic pathways to adjust its policies, which is crucial as it determines the boundaries of strategic options. The core of this war is not to occupy Tehran, but to paralyze the regime, destroy its capabilities, and force it to accept new conditions.

Even if the regime collapses under military and economic pressure, the U.S. can still achieve its objectives within a new strategic environment. However, it is important to emphasize that achieving objectives does not hinge upon the collapse of the regime.

From this moment on, the options are not decreasing, but expanding.

One option is to strike at the regime’s economic “center of gravity.” Kharg Island accounts for about 85% to 90% of Iran’s oil exports, typically averaging between 1.5 million to 2 million barrels per day. This oil is the regime’s primary source of hard currency. Controlling, paralyzing, or directly destroying its export capabilities affects not only the economy itself but also the entire regime’s ability to fund its military, maintain power networks, and sustain internal control.

This is important because the regime has already shown signs of vulnerability under economic pressure. The protests in January 2026 were sparked by inflation, instability in the banking system, and an inability to provide basic public services (including the severe water shortages affecting millions in Tehran). There was even discussion of relocating the capital due to an inability to provide safe drinking water. The regime’s response was a massive violent crackdown, resulting in over 32,000 civilian deaths in one of the most brutal suppression actions in its modern history. Therefore, economic pressure is not a theoretical projection but has already pushed the regime to the brink.

Another option is to target the national power grid. Iran’s power system is concentrated in major urban hubs, and precision strikes on key substations and transmission nodes could trigger widespread blackouts throughout the region—Tehran would be plunged into darkness.

Once power is lost, the regime will immediately find itself in trouble. Command and control, monitoring systems, communication networks, and internal security coordination all depend on power. By implementing precise strikes on key nodes, large-scale systemic paralysis can be triggered without completely destroying infrastructure. This capability has been demonstrated by the U.S. in past conflicts.

Cyber warfare further amplifies this effect. Iran has repeatedly used internet blackouts to control society, and this capability can be reverse-engineered—to disrupt the regime’s command network while restoring connectivity for the people through external systems. Information itself becomes a weapon, with narrative control, coordination capabilities, and cognitive advantages shifting from the regime.

The Strait of Hormuz remains a decisive strategic hub. Approximately 20% of global oil supply (about 20 million barrels daily) passes through this channel. Iran’s long-standing strategy has been to threaten and manipulate this flow.

One option is to shift from “deterrence” to “control.” Occupying or neutralizing key islands. For a long time, experts have viewed Abu Musa Island and Greater and Lesser Tunb Islands as critical terrain for controlling the strait. Qeshm Island to the north hosts naval facilities, missile systems, and surveillance infrastructure for the Revolutionary Guard. These positions give Iran anti-ship missile coverage, fast attack boat operations, and maritime coercion capabilities. Once these islands are controlled or neutralized, Iran’s bargaining power in the strait will be fundamentally altered.

Iran has also built a system in the strait similar to “toll booths.” The Revolutionary Guard has effectively established a system requiring ships to gain approval, navigate routes under its influence, and in some cases pay millions of dollars in “security passage fees.” Reports indicate that fees for each oil tanker can reach up to $2 million, with selective passage based on political alignment, while controlled routes are established near Larak Island.

The U.S. and Israel have the capability to systematically dismantle this system: striking its command structure, destroying coastal radar, intelligence surveillance reconnaissance nodes, and command centers, and clearing fast boats, drones, and missile positions that enforce control. Once this system is dismantled, Iran will lose its ability to convert a global chokepoint into a source of revenue and a tool of coercion.

Another related option is to intercept Iranian oil exports at sea. Iran exports about 1.5 million to 2 million barrels daily, much of which is completed through a network that evades sanctions. By intercepting and diverting tankers, and conducting extensive inspections and seizures, this system can be squeezed to near standstill. Currently, such actions have been initiated on a limited scale, and expanding them further would bring the regime’s income close to zero. Without income, there are no missiles, no proxy networks, no repression capabilities, and not even the means to maintain state operations.

There are also options focused internally. Iran has a population of over 85 million, with a youthful and urbanized demographic that has long harbored discontent. Existing polls, protest patterns, and observable social unrest indicate that over 50% of the populace opposes the current regime, possibly even more. This is not a solid power base. The protests in January 2026 were a clear signal of this latent pressure.

So far, the populace has mostly been instructed to “shelter in place.” However, this strategy may change. Through information dissemination, secure channels, and psychological warfare, the control mechanisms between the populace and the regime can be gradually separated.

At the same time, support can be provided to internal resistance forces, including weapons, communications, and intelligence airdrops. Multiple fractures exist within Iran—long-standing tensions at ethnic, political, and regional levels have sparked opposition and unrest. When external pressure combines with internal resistance, the regime is more likely to experience fractures, or at least bear greater pressure.

Meanwhile, the range of strikes can continue to expand, beyond traditional military targets. The regime’s control system is essentially a network: including leadership, the Revolutionary Guard headquarters, Basij forces, police, intelligence agencies, and repressive infrastructure. Targeting these nodes will accelerate the collapse of central authority.

History shows that pressure can lead to fractures: the military starts to hesitate, intelligence systems splinter, political elites realign, and personnel defect. Collaborating with these defectors often yields effects that far exceed simple strikes.

Of course, there remain many unknowns. We cannot fully grasp where the regime is strongest and weakest. However, some signs are worth noting. For instance, reports indicate that Iran is attempting to expand the scale of mobilization, even lowering the recruitment age to 12 years, which suggests it is under significant pressure. This is not the behavior of a confident regime.

These options do not exist in isolation but can be combined: destroying missile systems and production capabilities, dismantling naval power, continuously weakening the nuclear program, and blocking its external projection capabilities. At the same time, by striking leadership and command systems, decision-making can be paralyzed, applying simultaneous pressure across military, economic, informational, and political dimensions.

The core lies in simultaneously attacking the regime’s “means” and “will,” rather than proceeding sequentially. Creating multiple dilemmas that exceed its coping capacity forces it into a passive survival state, elongating decision-making cycles, and weakening its coordination and control capabilities.

The essence of war is “choices within uncertainty”

War is not a checklist but a dynamic matching of objectives, paths, and means under uncertain conditions. Various options can be advanced sequentially, implemented in a layered manner, or launched simultaneously.

At the same time, caution is warranted against those who draw analogies with “certainty.” Iran is not Vietnam, Afghanistan, or Iraq, nor is it 1968, 2002, or 2003. Each contextual background is entirely different. Political objectives vary from “changing regime behavior” to “maintaining regime survival.” Past wars often involved state reconstruction, democratic export, long-term counterinsurgency, and adversaries having external safe havens, none of which are applicable in the current context. Geographic conditions, technological factors, intelligence capabilities, and regional dynamics have all changed. The options now available are more diverse and targeted.

We know what has happened, but we do not know what will happen. More importantly, we cannot predict the next steps of each party’s decision-making.

This uncertainty is not a flaw in analysis but the essence of warfare.

[Original Link]

Click to learn about job openings at BlockBeats

Welcome to join the official community of BlockBeats:

Telegram Subscription Group: https://t.me/theblockbeats

Telegram Discussion Group: https://t.me/BlockBeats_App

Twitter Official Account: https://twitter.com/BlockBeatsAsia