Another pre-sale sniping incident has been exposed.
In the pre-sale of the WET token by the HumidiFi project, a sniper took away 70% of the allocation. How did they do it? By using over 1,000 wallets to participate in the pre-sale, and now they’re turning around to ask the project team for a refund.
On-chain analysis tools tracked that among the 1,530 addresses in the pre-sale, at least 1,100 were controlled by the same person. This guy is pretty experienced—the funds were withdrawn from a centralized exchange and then sent to thousands of new wallets to launder the traces. Before the pre-sale started, each address precisely received 1,000 USDC, like an assembly line operation.
But no plan is foolproof. One address gave it away, with funds coming from a private wallet (address starting with 547Wwc). Tracing further, it was found that this wallet also transferred $150,000 to another address, AUG2N, which was also funded by the 547Wwc wallet. The most striking part is that the social account linked to this wallet directly points to a Twitter user, ramarxyz.
With such an aggressive Sybil attack, on-chain data still managed to expose the person. The project team must have a headache now—should they refund or not?
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HumidiFi presale sniped: 1,100 sockpuppet wallets took 70% of the shares, on-chain tracking identifies the players behind the scenes
Another pre-sale sniping incident has been exposed.
In the pre-sale of the WET token by the HumidiFi project, a sniper took away 70% of the allocation. How did they do it? By using over 1,000 wallets to participate in the pre-sale, and now they’re turning around to ask the project team for a refund.
On-chain analysis tools tracked that among the 1,530 addresses in the pre-sale, at least 1,100 were controlled by the same person. This guy is pretty experienced—the funds were withdrawn from a centralized exchange and then sent to thousands of new wallets to launder the traces. Before the pre-sale started, each address precisely received 1,000 USDC, like an assembly line operation.
But no plan is foolproof. One address gave it away, with funds coming from a private wallet (address starting with 547Wwc). Tracing further, it was found that this wallet also transferred $150,000 to another address, AUG2N, which was also funded by the 547Wwc wallet. The most striking part is that the social account linked to this wallet directly points to a Twitter user, ramarxyz.
With such an aggressive Sybil attack, on-chain data still managed to expose the person. The project team must have a headache now—should they refund or not?