Suppose there is such an extreme scenario: the "mathematical black box" behind zero-knowledge proof technology is exploited by attackers, and lisUSD is secretly over-issued by 100 times.

A project introduces ZK-Rollup technology to address scalability issues—transactions and balances are verified off-chain through zero-knowledge proofs. Sounds very secure, right? But what if the logic for generating ZK circuits is embedded with a "void minting" backdoor? Hackers could mint massive amounts of tokens off-chain and generate fake zero-knowledge proofs to deceive on-chain verification contracts. The on-chain contract, seeing that perfect mathematical proof, believes everything is fine and allows withdrawals.

When these void tokens flood the market and the exchange rate crashes, the community only notices the anomaly. But due to the privacy features of ZK, no one knows who over-issued or how much was over-issued. The entire ledger becomes unobservable like a quantum state. Fixing this would require abolishing the ZK system, forcing the disclosure of private data, and re-evaluating the system—technically difficult, and politically admitting the failure of this approach.

This teaches us a principle: **When we delegate auditing authority to an incomprehensible mathematical black box, it’s like handing the keys to the vault to someone who can manipulate that black box.** Unverifiable trust is ultimately dangerous.

(Note: The above is an analysis of an extreme hypothetical scenario, used to illustrate technical risks, not a real event.)